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Abstract
Selection into self-employment among the poor is dominated by subsistence
concerns, which leads to high levels of unproductive self-employment in
developing countries. We incorporate this view into an otherwise benchmark
macro-development model by allowing for labor frictions. Standard models that
rely only on financial frictions are at odds with crucial features of the data,
including large self-employment rates among the poor and the response of labor
markets after well-identified labor demand shocks. We study the efficacy of a wide
range of development policies on occupational choices, prices, and productivity.
We find that providing unemployment benefits improves selection into
self-employment, increasing total-factor productivity (TFP). Self-employment
grants and unconditional transfers lower TFP by making self-employment more
attractive to low-productivity individuals. Finally, financial reforms that improve
access to credit succeed in raising productivity, but they do not address the
subsistence concerns of poor individuals. Self-employment is still concentrated
among the poor after the reforms take place.
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1 Introduction
The behavior of self-employment across and within countries is well documented in
development economics, with two consistent messages (Schoar, 2010; Poschke, 2013a,b,
2019; Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani, 2020). First, self-employment rates decrease as
countries develop. For example, self-employment constitutes 65 percent of the
workforce in Bangladesh, but only 12 percent in the United States. Second,
self-employment rates are high among the rich and poor, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern
along the earnings distribution. These facts are summarized in Figure 1.
High self-employment rates among the poor are consistent with the self-insurance
role of self-employment for individuals facing unemployment risk in developing
countries.1 In the absence of other income sources, unemployed individuals may
engage in self-employment for subsistence reasons, rather than because of comparative
advantage in entrepreneurial activities. We show that the self-insurance and
subsistence motives behind self-employment shape the macroeconomic effects of
development policies.
However, benchmark models in the macro-development literature ignore the
self-insurance role of self-employment. We allow for subsistence concerns to dominate
selection into self-employment among the poor by introducing unemployment risk
into an otherwise standard macro-development model. We use existing cross-sectional
evidence to distinguish between models with and without subsistence concerns.
Notably, the observed response of wages and employment to a well-identified labor
demand shock rejects the benchmark macro-development model. Furthermore, our
model captures many non-targeted moments, including the pattern of self-employment
rates across the earnings distribution (Figure 1b).
We use our model to study typical development policies, differentiating between
their general and partial equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two types of
policies: targeted cash transfers and credit-deepening reforms. Cash transfers are
ubiquitous across the developing world, and their design has direct consequences for
selection into self-employment and aggregate productivity. Financial reforms that
improve credit access also affect aggregate productivity, with important implications
for wages and workforce composition, as they change incentives to engage in
self-employment.
1Labor market frictions have been shown to play a crucial role in explaining cross-country differences
along the development path. See the recent work of Poschke (2019) and Feng, Lagakos, and Rauch (2020).
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Figure 1: Self-Employment Around the World
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(b) Self-Employment and Earnings
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Note: The left panel shows self-employment rates for countries around the world, as a function of their GDP per
capita. The size of each bubble illustrates the population size of each country. Data source: World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. The right panel shows the joint distribution of income and self-employment for the
U.S. and nine developing economies for which we had access to household surveys (Azerbaijan, Albania, Bulgaria,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Serbia, and South Africa). We compute self-employment rates in 50 equal-sized
quantiles of the income distribution. The underlying data comes from the CPS for the U.S. and from household
surveys for the developing countries. We report the profile for each individual country in Figure E.2.
Understanding the macroeconomic effects of development policies is a first-order
concern. The developing world spends significant resources on policies to alleviate
poverty and boost productivity, with uncertain macroeconomic effects.2 The economy’s
response to these policies depends on the direct impact on beneficiaries and the general
equilibrium feedback between individual choices and prices, affecting those not
directly targeted.
Our model is a tractable extension of the occupational choice model by Buera,
Kaboski, and Shin (2015) that incorporates unemployment risk. There are employed,
self-employed, and unemployed agents. While agents can become self-employed or
unemployed at will (by starting their own business or quitting their job), they can only
become employed after receiving a job offer. When unemployment becomes intolerable
for poor individuals, they turn to self-employment as a source of income, regardless of
their entrepreneurial productivity. Self-employment acts as self-insurance. Without
unemployment risk, self-employment is taken up by agents who are productive
enough to have higher earnings as self-employed entrepreneurs than as salaried
workers.
2Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri (2019) reviewed the evidence of cash transfers in the developing world.
Sukhtankar (2016) reviewed the NREGS, the largest employment guarantee program in the world.
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Introducing unemployment risk allows the model to match the responses of wages
and employment to well-identified labor demand shocks estimated in cross-sectional
studies (Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani, 2020; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar,
2017), even when this moment is not targeted in the calibration. In the data, the increase
in wages is smaller than the rise in employment after the same labor demand shock. In
standard macro-development models that stress the role of collateral constraints (Moll,
2014; Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2015), aggregate wages rise
considerably to accommodate additional labor demand. In a model with unemployment
risk, however, low-income self-employed individuals meet the additional labor demand
with little upward pressure on wages.
Our model also captures many non-targeted patterns of self-employment selection
and behavior. The model predicts a U-shaped profile of self-employment rates across
the earnings distribution, present in a variety of countries. Removing unemployment
risk makes the pattern disappear, predicting a concentration of self-employed agents
only among the rich. Moreover, the subsistence concerns that generate the U-shaped
profile are also present in a version of our model without collateral constraints, the main
ingredient stressed in benchmark macro-development models.
Cash transfers targeted to various population groups are a staple of government
action in developing (and developed) countries. Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri (2019)
reported that government-provided cash transfers reach on average 11 percent of the
population of low- and middle-income countries. These transfers are substantial,
amounting on average to 18 percent of the beneficiaries’ expenditures. Moreover, the
targeting of the transfers influences the recipients’ occupational choices, leading to
large changes in the makeup of the workforce, as well as in productivity and wages.
We find that cash transfers to the unemployed increase productivity by improving
selection into self-employment. The gains are substantial, around a 3 percentage-point
increase in TFP in our simulated exercise, and they hold when the program is financed
with distortionary income taxes. General equilibrium forces are important to reach this
answer. The transfers prevent unproductive individuals from engaging in
self-employment, increasing the labor supply and imposing downward pressure on
equilibrium wages. Lower wages increase the optimal scale of the firms owned by the
more productive self-employed.
We then study the effects of cash transfers to poor individuals, regardless of their
occupation.3 At fixed prices, cash transfers are successful at reducing self-employment
3Unconditional transfers resemble universal basic income or guaranteed income schemes, but they
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rates, by increasing the threshold of productivity at which poor agents become self-
employed. However, the transfers entail general equilibrium effects that reverse most
of the positive effects in partial equilibrium. Once we account for how wages clear the
labor market, self-employment increases and total factor productivity falls.
When the transfers target self-employed individuals, selection into self-employment
worsens, subsistence self-employment increases, and TFP falls. The reform is successful
at lowering the unemployment rate, but for the wrong reasons. In this dimension, our
results align with the theory of Feng, Lagakos, and Rauch (2020), showing that decreases
in unemployment are not necessarily evidence of improving economic conditions.
Finally, we evaluate the effects of financial reforms that loosen the collateral
constraints faced by the self-employed. The financial and informational frictions that
prevent entrepreneurs’ access to credit have long been viewed as an important driver
of misallocation and low productivity in developing economies. In fact, these frictions
are at the heart of most macro-development models, e.g. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin
(2015). We revisit the role of these frictions in the presence of subsistence concerns by
first relaxing and then eliminating the collateral constraints in the model.
In line with the previous literature, credit-deepening reforms that loosen the agents’
collateral constraints reduce misallocation and increase productivity. The reforms also
increase unemployment, as individuals move from low-productivity self-employment
activities into frictional labor markets. However, financial reform, even when taken to
the limit of eliminating collateral constraints, does not solve the subsistence concerns
that lead poor individuals to choose self-employment, preserving the U-shaped pattern
of self-employment across the earnings distribution.
Related Literature
Our work is related to a longstanding strand of literature linking productivity and
misallocation to entrepreneurship and self-employment (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009,
2014; Banerjee and Moll, 2010; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013; Midrigan and Xu, 2014;
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2020). We contribute by showing the conceptual and
quantitative importance of subsistence concerns behind self-employment in driving
macroeconomic aggregates and responses to economic policy.4
Selection into self-employment is at the core of our mechanism. Heathcote,
also capture the difficulty of distinguishing between unemployed and self-employed individuals in the
presence of informality.
4In related studies, Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009) quantify the extent to which
financial frictions distort the scale of firms.
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Storesletten, and Violante (2008) studied the welfare effects of insurance and risk, while
Hombert, Schoar, Sraer, and Thesmar (2020, 2016); Garcia-Cabo and Madera (2019);
Levine and Rubinstein (2020) discussed the role of risk and ability on selection into
entrepreneurship and self-employment. We contribute by evaluating the relevance of
these margins in influencing the aggregate economy and the response to economic
policy when agents face subsistence concerns.
The introduction of unemployment risk is key to generating the subsistence concerns
that lead unproductive agents to engage in self-employment. More broadly, Poschke
(2019) showed how labor market frictions are vital to explain cross-country differences
in the composition of the workforce. We show that these frictions not only lead to higher
self-employment rates in developing countries, but also explain the joint distribution of
income and occupations that in turn shape the aggregate response to policy.
Our work complements recent papers on the role of structural transformation in
wage and unemployment dynamics. As countries develop, people are pulled from
low-productivity activities into more “modern” sectors. During early stages of
development, activities like self-employment can absorb or supply labor in response to
shocks, muting the response of wages. Storesletten, Zhao, and Zilibotti (2019) linked
this pattern to the unresponsiveness of wages to business cycles in China. Feng,
Lagakos, and Rauch (2020) documented a positive relation between unemployment
and GDP per capita around the world, driven by the reallocation of individuals into
modern sectors.
Finally, our paper speaks to a large literature that studies the efficiency of social
programs in developing countries, where informality is high (Meghir, Narita, and
Robin, 2015). Our results indicating that unemployment benefits increase aggregate
productivity align with the positive effects of unemployment benefits extensions found
by Gerard and Gonzaga (2020) and Britto (2020).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we describe the main mechanism
behind self-employment under unemployment risk in section 2. Then, we describe the
model and its calibration in sections 3 and 4. In section 5, we show that the model is
consistent with the observed features of self-employment. Finally, in section 6, we use
the model to study the effects of cash transfers and credit-deepening reforms.
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2 Self-employment as self-insurance
What drives individuals to become self-employed? We sketch the problem faced by an
agent considering self-employment to illustrate the core of our argument. We show that
the combination of unemployment risk and limited credit access induces poor agents to
become self-employed, even if they have low entrepreneurial productivity, generating a
mass of low-earning self-employed agents. This mechanism disappears in the presence
of strong safety nets.5 Policies that mitigate the downside of labor income risk reduce
the likelihood that low-productivity agents will choose self-employment.
Consider an agent choosing between unemployment (U) or self-employment (S).
The agent has a units of assets and a productivity of z. Utility depends only on
consumption and satisfies lim
c→0+
u
′
(c) =∞. There is no borrowing or lending.
If the agent chooses unemployment, she can become employed (E) with probability
p ∈ (0, 1], receiving a wage w > 0 and consuming cE = a + w. If she does not get a job,
the agent receives unemployment income b ∈ [0, w) and consumes cU = a+ b.
Alternatively, the agent can become self-employed. Self-employment income (or
production) depends on her assets and her productivity according to f (a, z).
Consumption for the self-employed is: cS = a+ f (a, z).
The agent becomes self-employed when the utility of doing so exceeds the expected
utility of looking for a job: u (a+ f (a, z)) > p · u (a+ w) + (1− p) · u (a+ b). For each
level of wealth a, this inequality defines a threshold value for productivity (z), above
which agents opt into self-employment, as shown in Figure 2.
The occupational choice of poor agents is heavily influenced by the level of
unemployment income (b), which determines their consumption. When b is low,
unemployment becomes intolerable. Self-employment acts as self-insurance against
unemployment risk, bounding consumption away from zero for poor agents. Via this
mechanism, the productivity threshold decreases as agents become poorer, even
though self-employment income decreases as well. Agents will become self-employed
even when they lack the productivity or the assets needed to run a profitable business.6
5The mechanism is also absent when there is no labor income risk, a common feature in the macro-
development literature; see, for instance, Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2015).
6Paulson and Townsend (2005) elaborated similar ideas in a short policy note. They showed evidence
from Thailand during the Asian crisis of 1997, after which “entrepreneurial activity in Thailand increased
... [and] the number of business households more than doubled.” The authors further noted that “rising
unemployment and falling real wages during the crisis led to changes in the types of people who started
businesses—and in the types of businesses they started” (pp. 34-35).
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Figure 2: Occupational Choice: Unemployment vs. Self-Employment
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Note: The figure characterizes the occupational choice of the agent for different levels of unemployment income.
Lines depict the threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of assets (a) and a given value of unemployment
income. The agent chooses self-employment if productivity is above the threshold.
Unlike poor agents, wealthy agents are not sensitive to unemployment income. They
choose self-employment whenever their entrepreneurial income would be sufficiently
high relative to their potential labor income, using their wealth for self-insurance. Thus,
only sufficiently productive or sufficiently wealthy agents become self-employed.7
The mechanisms we highlight have important implications for the effects of
development policies targeting the poor, such as unemployment benefits, cash
transfers, or micro-finance. Whenever agents turn to self-employment to escape
unemployment, they become “disguised unemployed, or forced entrepreneurs” (Breza,
Kaur, and Shamdasani, 2020). The quantitative relevance of this type of selection
depends on the density of agents at the bottom of the wealth distribution, and,
crucially, on their access to both credit markets and insurance against income risk. As
Figure 2 shows, unemployment benefits can affect selection by reducing the incentives
of unproductive agents to become self-employed. In section 6, we study the
quantitative ability of this policy to improve productivity and increase the supply of
labor in the economy.8
Other policies, like micro-finance, affect selection by making self-employment more
attractive, potentially reducing allocative efficiency. This mechanism is well-known in
7Selection into self-employment for the wealthy works in the same way as in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin
(2011), where there is no unemployment (p = 1), and no uncertainty over wages.
8The potential productivity gains from unemployment insurance through better selection have been
explored before; see, for instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000).
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the literature (e.g., Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2020), but there has been little emphasis
on the role of unemployment risk in determining the magnitude of the effect on
productivity. Absent insurance against unemployment, benefits tied to
self-employment lead a larger share of agents to become self-employed, despite having
low productivity. We explore this mechanism in Section 6.
3 Model
In this section we describe a quantitative macro-development model with occupational
choice, in which agents face unemployment risk and financial frictions. We extend the
baseline macro-development model in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2015) of employed
(E) and self-employed (S) agents by introducing unemployment (U) and limiting the
transitions between occupations.
Occupations differ with respect to their income source and whether or not agents
can freely opt into them. Agents can become self-employed or unemployed at will. In
contrast, transitions to employment are governed by exogenous processes that capture
(in a reduced form) the arrival of job offers to unemployed and self-employed agents.
Agents are free to reject job offers and keep their current occupations.
There is a continuum of agents in a small open economy. Time is continuous and goes
on forever. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their occupations {E,U, S}, their
productivity (z), and their asset holdings (a). Employed agents receive labor income,
which depends on the aggregate wage rate w and a function of their productivity z.
Unemployed agents receive a constant income b.9 Self-employed agents produce final
goods using capital and labor, with a technology indexed by the agent’s productivity.
Productivity (z) follows a Poisson process with arrival rate γz. Upon arrival, the
agent draws a new value for z from a conditional probability distribution Prz (z′|z). Job
offers also follow Poisson processes with arrival rates γU for the unemployed and γS for
the self-employed.
As is standard in the literature, agents have limited access to credit markets.
Employed and unemployed agents face a borrowing limit a ≤ 0. Self-employed agents
can borrow to obtain productive capital, but they face a collateral constraint that
depends on their assets: k ≤ λa. This reduced-form collateral constraint captures
9Unemployment income b can be interpreted as home production, or as transfers from family members
or government agencies. In section 6 we take the latter view and examine what happens if b increases.
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information frictions and commitment problems, which we do not model explicitly. See
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), among others, for the
micro-foundations of the borrowing constraint.
We depart from previous models in two important and intertwined ways. First, we
include labor income risk by letting the labor income of employed agents fluctuate.
Second, we prevent agents from becoming employed at will by including labor market
frictions.10 Without these features, employment serves as an outside option from
self-employment (where income is volatile, following changes in productivity).
Consequently, the standard family of models in macro-development is unable to
produce self-employed agents with low assets and productivity. In our model,
self-employment serves primarily as an outside option for unemployed agents.
In Appendix B we present a version of the model without unemployment risk. This
alternative model is a useful point of reference for judging the performance of the model,
as we show in section 4.
3.1 The Agent’s Problem
The problem of an agent depends on her occupation. We discuss each occupation in
turn. In what follows we denote as V o the value of an agent in occupation o ∈ {E,U, S},
taking into account the occupational choice of the agent, and we denote as Ṽ o the value
that the agent would receive if she were to remain in occupation o.
Employment Agents receive a labor income of wε(z), where ε(z) = exp(η log(z)), and η
captures the relevance of productivity for the earnings of employed workers. Employed
agents are subject to job destruction shocks with arrival rate γE that force them into
unemployment. Agents can also voluntarily become unemployed or self-employed at
any time. The value for an employed agent who remains employed is given by Ṽ E :
ρṼ E (a, z) = max
c
u (c) + V Ea (a, z) ȧ+ γ
E
(
V U (a, z)− Ṽ E (a, z)
)
(1)
+γz
∫ (
V E (a, z′)− Ṽ E (a, z)
)
dPrz (z′|z)
s.t. ȧ = wε(z) + ra− c a ≥ a
10Most of the literature assumes labor income to be common to all agents (given by the market wage)
and allows agents to opt freely into employment, instead, imposing costs to engage in entrepreneurship.
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Unemployment Agents receive an income of b and are subject to job offers with
arrival rate γU . They are free to reject an offer depending on their current assets and
productivity. They can also choose to become self-employed at any time. The value for
an agent who remains unemployed is given by Ṽ U :
ρṼ U (a, z) = max
c
u (c) + V Ua (a, z) ȧ+ γ
U max
{
V E (a, z)− Ṽ U (a, z) , 0
}
(2)
+γz
∫ (
V U (a, z′)− Ṽ U (a, z)
)
dPrz (z′|z)
s.t. ȧ = b+ ra− c a ≥ a
Self-employment Agents receive income from profits, π (a, z), generated by their
productive activities. Self-employed agents receive job offers at a rate γS , which they
are free to reject. The agent can also choose to become unemployed at any time. The
value for an agent who continues being self-employed is Ṽ S :
ρṼ S (a, z) = max
c
u (c) + V Sa (a, z) ȧ+ γ
S max
{
V E (a, z, ε)− Ṽ S (a, z) , 0
}
(3)
+γz
∫ (
V S (a, z′)− Ṽ S (a, z)
)
dPrz (z′|z)
s.t. ȧ = π (a, z) + ra− c a ≥ a
π (a, z) = max
k≤λa , n≥0
{
z
(
kαn1−α
)ν − wn− (r + δ) k} ,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and ν ≤ 1.
The optimal consumption/savings decision can be found in all cases from the first-
order condition of the agent’s problem (see Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll, 2020).
Letting o ∈ {E,U, S} denote the occupational state of the agent, we have:
co(a, z) = u
′−1 (V oa ( a, z)) . (4)
To account for occupational choices, the value function of an agent reflects the upper
envelope of the choices available to her at every instant. This is akin to a value-matching
condition in optimal stopping-time problems (Stokey, 2009). The following conditions
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must hold:
V E (a, z) = max
{
Ṽ E (a, z) , Ṽ U (a, z) , Ṽ S (a, z)
}
, (5)
V U (a, z) = max
{
Ṽ U (a, z) , Ṽ S (a, z)
}
, (6)
V S (a, z) = max
{
Ṽ U (a, z) , Ṽ S (a, z)
}
. (7)
The last two conditions imply that unemployment and self-employment must give the
same value to the agent; this is because the agent can instantaneously move between the
two occupations, so any difference in value is arbitraged away.
3.2 Labor market
There is a common labor market. Total labor supply in efficiency units is given by the
integral over the efficiency units of employed agents:
NS =
∫
ε(z)dGE , (8)
where GE is the distribution of employed agents in the economy.
The only source of labor demand is the businesses of the self-employed. Total labor
demand is thus given by:
ND =
∫
n (a, z) dGS , (9)
where GS is the distribution of self-employed agents in the economy and n (a, z) is the
optimal labor demand from a self-employed agent with asset a and productivity z.
3.3 Aggregate output and productivity
Aggregate output in the economy is given by
Y ≡
∫
z
(
k(a, z)αn(a, z)1−α
)ν
dGS = Z
(
MS
)1−ν (
KαN (1−α)
)ν
, (10)
with aggregate inputs K ≡
∫
k (a, z) dGS and N as in (9). MS ≡
∫
dGS is the mass
of self-employed agents, which plays a role due to the decreasing returns to scale of
the production technology. Finally, Z measures the aggregate (average) productivity or
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TFP:
Z ≡
[
1
MS
∫ (
z · 1
τ̃(a, z)
) 1
1−ν
dGS
]1−ν
, (11)
where τ̃ is defined as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to be a firm-specific wedge that
captures the extent of the distortions generated by the collateral constraint.11 The
aggregation procedure is standard and follows Hopenhayn (2014).
Without the collateral constraint there would be no wedges and τ̃(a, z) = 0 for all
firms. However, eliminating τ̃ from (11) is not enough to compute aggregate
productivity in the absence of the constraint; instead, it is necessary to recompute the
full equilibrium of the economy. Aggregate productivity depends on the distribution of
the self-employed, which reacts endogenously to changes in the constraints, in turn
changing prices and factor demands. Setting τ̃(a, z) = 0 in (11) only captures the effect
of constraints on self-employed agents with firms operating at current prices.
3.4 Equilibrium
We evaluate the effects of several policies in our model. We focus on the stationary
equilibrium of the economy. The definitions of the equilibrium value and policy
functions, prices, and stationary distributions are standard and we present them in
Appendix A. Appendix D describes the computational implementation of the solution.
3.5 Discussion of modeling assumptions
There are three assumptions that deserve discussion. First, labor demand comes
exclusively from the self-employed. Second, job-arrival rates are fixed parameters
instead of functions of the labor market tightness. Third, income shocks across
occupations are driven by the same shifter z.
The first assumption imposes a tight link between labor demand by the
self-employed and the overall labor supply. In the model, shifts in labor supply require
reassigning self-employed agents to employment, reducing labor demand.
Consequently, equilibrium wages in the model are very responsive to changes in the
occupational choices of agents (as we see in sections 6.1 and 6.4). This link can be
11Formally, τ̃ is such that k(a, z) =
[(
να
τ̃(a,z)(R+δ)
)1−ν(1−α) (
ν(1−α)
w
)ν(1−α)
z
] 1
1−ν
for each (a, z).
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weakened by introducing a corporate sector that demands labor (as in Kitao, 2008), or
by introducing a new sector that mixes entrepreneurial output with labor to produce
final goods (as in Guvenen, Kambourov, Kuruscu, Ocampo, and Chen, 2019). We
choose not to pursue these extensions because our objective with the model is to
highlight the mechanisms arising from unemployment risk, nesting
macro-development models without it.
Second, we chose to impose fixed job-arrival rates because we are aiming for
parsimony and comparability with models used in the macro-development literature.
The main consequence of fixing these arrival rates is muting a set of general
equilibrium effects that may affect the response to policy.12 Nevertheless, these general
equilibrium effects are likely to strengthen the results we provide in section 6.
Finally, we assume that shocks to self-employment productivity and employed
earnings at the individual level are perfectly correlated. We consider that this is a
conservative assumption, as it prevents gains from misallocation of individual agents
(there are no individuals who are unproductive as self-employed but highly productive
as employed). Additionally, this assumption allows us to match the joint income
dynamics of employed and self-employed agents in a parsimonious way. We explored
the results of the model under the alternative assumption that the productivity levels of
different occupations are determined by independent shocks. Our main results are
robust to this alternative, and the alternate analyses are available upon request.
Two assumptions on the problem of the self-employed deserve a note as well. The
first one is that the self-employed have access to capital at the global (risk-free) interest
rate. The second is that self-employed agents operate a common technology.
The global risk-free interest rate is lower than the rate that entrepreneurs in
developing countries actually face. As a consequence, self-employment in the model
becomes more attractive and the optimal scale of businesses increases. However, the
quantitative effect of a low interest rate is small for the least productive self-employed,
who are the focus of this paper, given that their optimal scale is close to zero.
Finally, introducing a menu of technologies and installation costs, as in Midrigan
and Xu (2014) or Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), would only strengthen our results by
making low-productivity self-employment more attractive for low-wealth agents, who
12For instance, if there is an increase in unemployment benefits, the number of unemployed workers
increases, reducing labor demand (section 6.1). This would increase market tightness, in turn inducing
vacancy creation among firms still in operation. Absent these effects, all the adjustment in the labor
market has to come through the wage rate.
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would choose inferior technologies associated with low installation costs. A similar
logic follows from expanding the model to allow for formal and informal technologies,
akin to Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015). In section 6 we consider an important
dimension of informality: the distortions arising from income taxes levied on salaried
workers but not on self-employed individuals.
4 Model calibration
We calibrate the model in two steps. First, we calibrate a group of parameters
externally, with values taken from the literature or chosen independently of the
model’s equilibrium outcomes. We then choose a second group of parameters to match
targeted moments of the earnings distribution, workforce composition, and transition
rates across occupations. We use aggregate and micro data from Mexico to calibrate the
second group of parameters.13 Before discussing the parameter values, we define the
parameterization of the productivity process and the discretization of assets.
Productivity process We discretize the process for productivity (z) so that the
conditional probability distribution Prz (z′|z) is characterized by a stochastic matrix of
dimensions nz × nz. We use the method proposed in Rouwenhorst (1995) to discretize
an AR(1) processes for log(z). This reduces the number of parameters to choose from
nz(nz − 1) to just the standard deviation and persistence of the process, σz, and ρz. We
also set nz = 11. We experimented with finer grids and verified that our results do not
depend on the particular size we chose.
Asset grid We use a curved grid with na = 120 nodes. Curvature ensures a higher
density for low levels of assets. The limits of the grid are given by the borrowing
constraint (a) and an asset barrier (a). The asset grid is given by:
ai = a+
(
i− 1
na − 1
)ηa
(a− a) for i ∈ {1, . . . , na}. (12)
The values of all computational parameters are presented in Table 1b.
Externally calibrated parameters We set a number of parameters to values common
in the literature or to match features of the Mexican economy; we summarize them in
Table 1a. The discount factor is taken from Moll (2014) to match a 5 percent annual
13This choice is motivated by the availability of high-quality data that allow us to explore the
composition of the workforce, as well as individual transitions in and out of self-employment.
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Externally Calibrated Parameters Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
r? International Interest Rate 0.0075 b Unemployment Income w · 10−5
ρ Discount Factor 0.0125 γE Job Destruction Arrival Rate 0.20
σ CRRA Parameter 2 γU Job Offer Arrival Rate - U 0.80
α Technology - Capital Share 0.3 γS Job Offer Arrival Rate - S 0.50
δ Capital Depreciation 0.0125 ε Labor Efficiency- Base Value 0.10
ν Technology - Decreasing Returns 0.85 η Labor Efficiency - Shifter 3.10
λ Equity Constraint 1.42 z Productivity - Base Value 1.00
γε Labor Efficiency - Arrival Rate 1 σz Productivity - Variance 0.12
γz Productivity - Arrival Rate 1 ρz Productivity - Persistence 0.17
(a) Model Parameters
Parameter Value
a Borrowing Constraint 10−5
ā Asset Barrier 200
ηa Asset Grid Curvature 2
na Asset Grid Size 120
nε Productivity Grid Size 11
(b) Computational Parameters
Table 1: Parameters
discount rate. We set the annual interest rate at 3 percent, to target an annual gap
between the interest rate, and set the discount factor to 0.02 as in Itskhoki and Moll
(2019). The degree of decreasing returns (ν) is taken from Midrigan and Xu (2014). The
curvature of the utility function (σ) is set to 2, and the power of capital in the
self-employed production technology (α) is set to 0.3, consistent with standard values
used in the literature. We set the collateral constraint parameter (λ) to match a
debt-to-asset ratio of 42 percent, consistent with observed debt-to-asset ratios for large
firms in Mexico, gathered from Compustat. We set the depreciation rate of capital to an
annual rate of 5 percent. Finally, we set unemployment income to w · 10−5, a positive
but small value, to avoid unemployed agents having zero consumption.
Internally calibrated parameters We jointly choose the values for 6 parameters, σz,
ρz, γU , γE , γS , and η, to target 6 moments. These are the unemployment rate, the self-
employment rate, the volatility of log-income for employed and self-employed agents,
and the correlation of individual-level income for agents who stay employed and who
stay self-employed in consecutive quarters (corr(yot , yot+1) for o ∈ S,E).
Although these six parameters affect all six moments, loosely speaking the γo
parameters are more important for mean occupational rates as they affect transitions
between occupations. The remaining parameters, η, σz, and ρz, are more important for
income moments as they affect the productivity process. We report the values of the
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Occupational Rates Data Model Income Moments Data Model
Unemployment 4.4 4.1 std(ySt ) 0.86 0.86
Self-employment 26.7 26.2 std(yEt ) 0.54 0.58
Employment 69.1 69.7 corr(ySt , ySt+1) 0.59 0.59
corr(yEt , yEt+1) 0.60 0.58
Table 2: Targeted Moments
Note: The table specifies targeted moments for internally calibrated parameters. We only target two out of the three
occupational rates, as together they imply the third. We report all three occupational rates for completeness.
parameters in Table 1a, while the value of the targeted moments in the data and the
model is shown in Table 2. We match all moments closely, including income moments
for the employed and self-employed, despite having a single productivity shifter.
The data we use to construct the targeted moments comes from the Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE), a household survey administered by the
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) in Mexico.14 The ENOE includes
a rotating panel of responding households who participate in the survey for up to five
quarters. We restrict our attention to men aged 23 to 65 who are heads of households
and who live in one of Mexico’s ten largest municipalities.15 We analyze data from
2005.Q1 to 2019.Q4. We define as self-employed an individual who reports working in
their own business. In Appendix E.1 we document the comparison of average
occupational rates for our samples versus the overall Mexican population, and versus
the U.S. population as a benchmark.
One key result is that the calibration implies a lower job-offer arrival rate for the
self-employed (γS), compared to the arrival rate for the unemployed (γU). Lower
job-arrival rates from self-employment are consistent with cross-sectional findings by
Jackson (2020), who indicated that engaging in gig-economy jobs in the U.S. reduces
the rate at which individuals find salaried employment. In Appendices E.2 and E.3, we
provide a battery of reduced-form correlations documenting that individuals in Mexico
who have second earners in their household or receive remittances from abroad
(variables that indicate fewer financial constraints) transition into self-employment less
often, even when their self-reported job finding activities are similar to individuals
who have neither remittances nor second earners. We also document that individuals
who engage in self-employment transition less into salaried work than their
unemployed counterparts. We take this evidence as suggestive of potential negative
14See http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/historicas/enoe/.
15Our results are robust to including both men and women instead.
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effects of self-employment for some agents who engage in it out of necessity.
5 Model performance and validation
We now turn to the model’s ability to match salient features of self-employment in
developing economies. As mentioned above, the model is able to match the targeted
moments (Table 2). More importantly, it performs well on a wide range of non-targeted
dimensions, like the prevalence of self-employment across the income distribution, the
relative response of wages to employment after a well-identified shock to labor
demand, transition rates across occupations, and individual-level income changes after
an occupation change. Further, the data strongly reject an alternative version of the
model without unemployment risk.
Self-employment across the income distribution An important success of the model
is matching self-employment rates across the income distribution, as in Figure 1b. The
model produces low-earning self-employed agents in equilibrium, capturing the joint
distribution of occupational rates and earnings.
Figure 3a plots the self-employment rate for individuals in each decile of the
earnings distribution, both in the data and the model.16 The model captures the
observed u-shape of self-employment rates thanks to the selection into
self-employment from unemployment (Figure 3b). As explained in section 2, poor
unemployed agents become self-employed even when their productivity is low, thus
generating a mass of low-earning self-employed agents.
In contrast, the standard macro-development model that abstracts from
unemployment risk cannot generate the u-shaped pattern between income and
self-employment. Figure 4a shows the pattern of self-employment across the earnings
distribution for the model without unemployment risk, presented in Appendix B. In
models without unemployment risk, labor income constitutes a lower bound for
earnings and self-employment concentrates among high-earning agents exclusively.
Moreover, the ability of the model to generate the U-shaped pattern between
income and self-employment does not depend on the presence of collateral constraints,
16To compute the data series in Figure 3a, we first run a regression of the form log(earni,t) = α +
γt + βXi,t + ηi,t, where earni,t corresponds to the earnings of individual i at time t, and X is a vector of
individual-level controls. We rank η̂i,t and classify them in bins of 2 percent of the sample, then compute
the self-employment rate in each bin. The pattern we report is robust when we use raw earnings instead
of controlling for observables.
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Figure 3: Model Performance
(a) Self-Employment Rate by Decile of Earnings
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Note: The left panel reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution. The
red circles correspond to the baseline model with unemployment risk. Blue diamonds show the data equivalent for
Mexico. The right panel reports productivity thresholds characterizing the occupational choice of unemployed (light
gray line) and employed (dark gray line) agents. Lines depict the threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of
assets (a). The agent chooses self-employment if her productivity is above the threshold.
the main friction in the standard macro-development model. Figure 4b shows that the
model exhibits the same U-shaped pattern when we eliminate the collateral constraint
by letting λ go to infinity. We revisit this case in section 6.4.
Response to labor demand shocks We further distinguish models with and without
unemployment risk, by comparing their response to an exogenous increase in labor
demand. We contrast the implications of these models against cross-sectional evidence
from development economics that identifies the response of employment and wages to
this type of shock. The shocks to labor demand are identified in the data from
interventions administered at the local labor market level, and are therefore
informative about the general equilibrium effects at the core of our mechanism, making
them good evidence to validate model specifications.17
The empirical evidence comes from a randomized controlled intervention carried
out by Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2020) and from the implementation of the NREGS,
a National Job Guarantee Scheme in India (Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar,
2017). Both studies deal with the effects of additional labor demand coming from either
the researchers’ intervention or the government, both offering employment at market
wages. Both studies show that the reaction of wages to the shock is significantly smaller
than the reaction of employed work. We refer to this fact as an “elasticity of wage to
17The small open economy assumption we make implies that local interventions do not change the real
interest rate in untreated regions.
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Figure 4: Self-Employment Rate by Decile of the Earnings Distribution
(a) Labor Frictions: Unemployment Risk
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(b) Financial Frictions: Collateral Constraint
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Note: The figure reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution. The red circles
correspond to the baseline model with unemployment risk. The yellow squares in the left panel correspond to the
alternative model without unemployment risk. The yellow squares in the right panel correspond to the baseline
model without collateral constraints (λ→∞).
labor demand” (∆%w/∆%Nd) less than 1.18
To reproduce the response in workforce composition and wages to an increase in
labor demand, we modify the models by introducing government demand for labor
ngov, then solve for the new market-clearing wage.19 The total labor demand is
Nd =
∫
n?(a, z)dGS + ngov. (13)
Government labor demand amounts to 11.5 percent of the baseline demand for
efficiency units of labor.20
In response to an increase in labor demand by the government, the model implies a
reallocation of the workforce from self-employment into both higher employment and
unemployment. This response is in line with the results of Imbert and Papp (2015),
Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2020) and Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar
(2017). As Imbert and Papp (2015) found, there is a strong crowding-out effect on
private employment (in this case on self-employment). Private demand for labor
decreases by 9.35 percent (self-employment decreases by 1.25 percentage points).
However, the overall demand for labor increases (by about 2.15 percent), as does the
18This is the ratio of the elasticity of wages to the shock, over the elasticity of employment to the shock.
19In the spirit of the experimental intervention cited above and the implementation of the NREGS
program, we do not introduce taxes to finance the government’s labor demand.
20The size of the shock emulates the experiment by Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2020).
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Occupational Transition Rates
Data Model Data Model Data Model
U → U 27.4 29.3 S → U 1.9 4.6 E → U 3.1 2.5
U → S 14.6 23.6 S → S 76.8 62.2 E → S 8.1 12.8
U → E 58.0 47.1 S → E 21.3 33.1 E → E 88.8 84.7
Income Moments
Data Model Data Model
corr(yEt , ySt+1) 0.43 0.39 corr(ySt , yEt+1) 0.43 0.34
Table 3: Untargeted Moments
Note: The table specifies untargeted moments. All transition rates are quarterly and reported in percentage points.
The income moments are auto-correlations of income conditional on occupational switching in consecutive quarters.
unemployment share of the workforce (by 0.3 percentage points). These movements
are qualitatively in line with the findings of Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2020). The
decrease in self-employment comes mostly from the low-productivity self-employed
agents (see figure C.1 in Appendix C).
Crucially, the increase in labor demand is not accompanied by a sizeable increase in
wages. The market wage (per efficiency-unit of labor) increases by 0.35 percent,
implying an relative elasticity of wage to labor after a labor demand shock (∆%w/∆%Nd)
of 0.16. This is consistent with the experimental evidence referenced above, which
establishes a low response of wages relative to increases in labor demand. The presence
of unemployment risk and low-earning self-employed agents plays a crucial role in
generating this result. In contrast, the increase in wages required to meet the additional
demand in the model without unemployment risk is an order of magnitude larger than
what is implied by the experimental evidence and our baseline model, producing an
“elasticity of wage to labor demand” of 1.6. As with the joint distribution of
self-employment and earnings, the data reject the model without unemployment risk
in policy-relevant dimensions.
Transition rates between occupations The model also does a good job capturing the
transition rates between occupations observed in the data, as shown in Table 3. We
compute transition rates in the same way in the data and in the model, based on the
occupation of agents at the end of each quarter.
All transitions have the right order of magnitude even though none of them was
targeted directly in our calibration. However, the model does not capture all transition
patterns. In particular, the model overstates the transition rate from unemployment to
self-employment (23 percent in the model versus 15 percent in the data). In both the
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data and the model, the low unemployment rate is explained by high transition rates
out of unemployment, particularly into self-employment.
Income of occupational switchers The model captures the correlation of income for
switchers observed in the data. This moment is particularly relevant for the gains or
losses following a reallocation of agents across occupations. Again, these are
untargeted moments. The model implies slightly lower correlations than those from
the data despite the common productivity shifter for both occupations, which is
explained by the role of assets in determining self-employment income. The correlation
between current and future income of individuals who switch from employment to
self-employment is 0.39 versus 0.43 in the data. The correlation of switchers from
self-employment to employment is 0.34 versus 0.43 in the data (Table 3).
6 Policy analysis
In this section, we analyze the response of the economy to a set of development policies
with macroeconomic implications. We study two broad sets of policies: targeted cash
transfers, and credit-deepening reforms which loosen collateral constraints. Within
cash transfers, we analyze the case of cash transfers to unemployed individuals, to
self-employed individuals, and to low-income individuals regardless of their
occupation. In each case, we report the partial equilibrium (PE) response of the
economy, the general equilibrium response with an unbalanced budget (GE), and a
balanced-budget general equilibrium response, where each policy we consider is
funded via linear labor income taxes.
We choose to focus on cash transfer policies for two reasons. They are ubiquitous in
policy implementation and discussions in the developing world, and they all influence
selection into self-employment and therefore have important consequences for
productivity. Each of these policies changes selection in a different way. We highlight
their effects on the two drivers behind selection into self-employment, subsistence
concerns and comparative advantage. Then, we discuss the effects of financial reform
in the context of the agents’ occupational choices. Reforms that loosen the constraints
faced by the self-employed improve allocative efficiency, but they also change the
incentives of agents to become self-employed.
In our analysis, we highlight different channels by which development policies affect
the economy. PE analysis focuses on the direct effects of policies on recipients, keeping
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prices constant. GE analysis highlights that, by affecting input prices like the wage rate,
policies also have an indirect effect on non-recipients and on the optimal scale of firms in
the economy. Balanced-Budget GE analysis goes yet one step further, to inquire whether
the distortionary taxation required to fund transfers undoes the effects of the policies.
The implementation of the policies takes two steps. First, the government targets
the policy using information on the economy before enactment. For example, if the
government gives a transfer to the bottom ten percent of the earnings distribution, the
income threshold to receive the transfer is calculated in an economy where the transfer
does not yet exist. In our judgement, that setting closely replicates the targeting
problems faced by authorities. Second, we assume governments can observe the
occupation and income of any individual. This is of course a simplification. In all cases,
we make the size of the transfer consistent to the average cash transfer in developing
countries, as reported by Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri (2019).
6.1 Cash transfers to the unemployed: Unemployment benefits
Unemployment benefits affect the occupational choices of self-employed individuals.
Section 2 highlights how access to higher unemployment income can deter
unproductive agents from engaging in self-employment. Unemployment benefits can
therefore improve efficiency by changing the selection into entrepreneurship and by
increasing the overall labor supply.21
We model unemployment insurance as an increase in the income of unemployed
agents, which is now b+ bUB.22 Our policy grants a transfer of 17% of the average labor
income to anyone who is unemployed. The benefits do not expire.
Unemployment benefits in partial equilibrium Unemployment benefits improve the
productivity distribution of those who would choose to be self-employed at fixed
prices. Figure 5a compares the baseline CDF of productivity among self-employed
agents to the CDF under unemployment benefits. The figure makes clear that the
21More generous safety nets that provide insurance against productivity risk may also improve
productivity by spurring entrepreneurship. See the recent work by Robinson (2020) and evidence from
France in Hombert, Schoar, Sraer, and Thesmar (2020, 2016). Unlike the case in this paper, the French
insurance program does not change the selection into self-employment because the unemployed already
had access to insurance.
22Our exercise is meant to capture a cash transfer to unemployed individuals, not to capture the many
specificities of established unemployment insurance (UI) schemes.
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Figure 5: Model Response to Unemployment Benefits in Partial Equilibrium
(a) CDF of Productivity
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Note: The left panel reports the CDF of productivity among self-employed agents. The continuous red line
corresponds to the baseline model. The dashed yellow line corresponds to the model with unemployment benefits
in partial equilibrium. The right panel reports productivity thresholds characterizing the occupational choice of
unemployed agents for the baseline model (continuous light gray line) and the model with unemployment benefits
(dashed dark gray line). Lines depict the threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of assets (a). The agent
chooses self-employment if productivity is above the threshold.
productivity distribution in partial equilibrium first-order stochastically dominates the
baseline distribution.
The shift in productivity is explained by a plummeting of self-employment rates
among unproductive agents, especially the poor, who, at constant wages, would prefer
to become unemployed and look for salaried work. Figure 5b shows the thresholds
of productivity at which unemployed individuals become self-employed as a function
of their wealth. Compared to the baseline, poor unemployed agents only become self-
employed if they have extremely high productivity (larger than the 99th percentile). In
the benchmark, sufficiently poor individuals become self-employed, even when they
have below-median productivity (gray line in the figure).
The change in selection triggers large occupational changes, as described in Column
3 of Table 4. At fixed prices, the self-employment rate decreases by 11.2 percentage
points. This decrease is matched by (roughly) even increases in unemployment and
employment. The decrease in self-employment happens across the income distribution,
but particularly in the tails, as both unproductive and highly productive agents prefer to
be unemployed and await a job offer. As a consequence, the pattern of self-employment
becomes flat throughout the income distribution (Figure 6a).
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Moment GE - τ GE PE Moment GE - τ GE PE
% ∆ W -1.6 -2.0 -— ∆ E -0.5 -0.7 -5.2
% ∆ Y -2.5 -2.3 -— ∆ S -5.8 -5.8 -11.7
%∆ TFP -3.2 -2.9 -— ∆ U -5.4 -5.1 -06.5
Table 4: Model Response to Unemployment Benefits
Note: The table presents changes in variables with respect to the baseline model. All numbers are in percentage
points. By design, the wage does not change in partial equilibrium. We refrain from reporting macroeconomic
aggregates that are constructed in partial equilibrium.
Unemployment benefits in general equilibrium In order to clear the labor market,
the wage rate decreases. Lower wages increase entrepreneurial income, but do so
disproportionately for the most productive agents. In this way, general equilibrium
forces undo the decrease of self-employment in the right-tail of the earnings
distribution, but maintain it among the poor. The result is a relatively flat
self-employment rate across the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution (at
around 20 percent) and a high rate among top earners (50 percent, see Figure 6b). Even
a mild unemployment benefit scheme can vastly change selection into self-employment
at the bottom of the income distribution.
Relative to the baseline, the decrease in wages is accompanied by a 5.8 percentage
point decrease in the self-employment rate (half as much as in PE), compensated almost
completely by an increase in the unemployment rate. The distribution of productivity
among the self-employed first order stochastically dominates the baseline distribution
(as in PE), which is reflected in a higher TFP. Despite this, output falls because of the
reduction in self-employment (see equation 10).23
Unemployment benefits in general equilibrium and balanced budget Financing
unemployment benefits with linear labor taxes τ does not meaningfully change the
results (see the GE-τ columns of Table 4). A tax of τ = 2.39% is required to balance the
budget in equilibrium:
τ
∫
w · ε(z)dGE = bUI · U. (14)
23The reduction in output is not implied by the introduction of unemployment benefits. For
instance, unemployment benefits increase output in an alternative version of the model where labor and
entrepreneurial productivity are not perfectly correlated.
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Figure 6: The Self-Employment Rate and Unemployment Benefits
(a) Partial Equilibrium
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(b) General Equilibrium
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Note: The figure reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution. The red circles
correspond to the baseline model. The yellow squares in the left panel correspond to the model with unemployment
benefits in partial equilibrium. The yellow squares in the right panel correspond to the model with unemployment
benefits in general equilibrium.
These taxes reduce labor income with respect to the baseline by 3.95 percent.24 The
reduction in prospective labor income deters some agents from taking a job (with
respect to unfunded GE), but, interestingly, does not prevent employment from
increasing while self-employment decreases substantially. The reason behind this is the
effect of unemployment benefits on poor unemployed agents. Transfers improve the
allocation of agents by making it possible for poor agents to remain unemployed.
Our results highlight how safety net programs can play a role in increasing
productivity in developing countries by affecting the occupation choices of individuals.
These programs not only allow individuals to search for jobs longer (Acemoglu and
Shimer, 1999, 2000; Chetty, 2008); they also prevent unproductive agents from engaging
in entrepreneurial activities for which they are ill-suited. This in an additional rationale
for these programs, beyond their insurance role against labor income fluctuations.
6.2 Income-Targeted Cash Transfers
Providing a monetary transfer to low-income individuals is one of the most ubiquitous
policies in the developing world. Transfers in low- and middle-income countries reach
11 percent of their population and amount to roughly 18 percent of the expenditures in
24Recall that the agents have no intensive margin decision over labor supply. Because of this, the
introduction of taxes only affects the agents’ occupational choice through changes in after-tax wages.
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Figure 7: Model Response to Targeted Cash Transfers in Partial Equilibrium
(a) CDF of Productivity
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Note: The left panel reports the CDF of productivity among self-employed agents. The continuous red line
corresponds to the baseline model. The dashed yellow line corresponds to the model with targeted cash transfers
in partial equilibrium. The right panel reports productivity thresholds characterizing the occupational choice of
unemployed agents for the baseline model (continuous light gray line) and the model with targeted cash transfers
(dashed dark gray line). Lines depict the threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of assets (a). The agent
chooses self-employment if productivity is above the threshold.
recipient households. See Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri (2019) for further references.
To be consistent with these figures, we provide a transfer targeting the poorest 10%
in terms of income in the baseline model. The transfer amounts to 15% of this group’s
consumption expenditures, or roughly 17% of the mean average labor income in the
economy. Importantly, the targeting is independent of the individual’s occupation or
other variables such as wealth.
Targeted cash transfers in partial equilibrium Unlike transfers targeted to the
unemployed, transfers given to the poor, irrespective of their occupation, lead to less
productive self-employed agents. Figure 7a shows that the distribution of productivity
worsens (in the FOSD sense) after the introduction of the transfers. This can seem
surprising, given the change in the productivity threshold that characterizes the
occupational choice of the unemployed (Figure 7b). Self-employment becomes less
attractive for the poorest among the unemployed, but it also becomes more attractive
for relatively wealthier agents with low productivity. At the same time, the transfers
induce agents to save less. In fact, asset holdings go down 35 percent in the
economy—39 percent among the self-employed.25 The combination of these two effects
25Daruich and Fernandez (2020) found similar results when analyzing the effects of Universal Basic
Income. One of the main determinants of welfare and output losses is the decrease in savings and hence
capital after the policy is enacted.
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Figure 8: The Self-Employment Rate and Targeted Cash Transfers
(a) Partial Equilibrium
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(b) General Equilibrium
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Note: The figure reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution. The red circles
correspond to the baseline model. The yellow squares in the left panel correspond to the model with targeted cash
transfers in partial equilibrium. The yellow squares in the right panel correspond to the model with targeted cash
transfers in general equilibrium.
leads to a pool of self-employed agents that are less productive and less wealthy.
The consequences of the change in selection and wealth accumulation are made
apparent by the distribution of self-employment across the earnings distribution.
Figure 8a shows that the reduction in self-employment (3.8pp, Table 5) is concentrated
among high earners, with a smaller decline among the bottom 10 percent of earners.
Targeted cash transfers in general equilibrium The fall in self-employment,
particularly among top earners, is undone in general equilibrium. Figure 8b makes this
clear. As with unemployment benefits, these effects are driven by lower wages (see
Table 5), which simultaneously make unemployment/employment less attractive and
make self-employment more profitable for highly productive agents.
In equilibrium, the introduction of targeted cash transfers incentivizes
self-employment (which goes up 0.66 percentage points), at the expense of salaried
employment (which goes down 0.77 percentage points). See the GE columns in Table 5.
These changes are consistent with cross-sectional results by Bianchi and Bobba (2013),
who compared treated and control regions after the enactment of Progresa, a large
conditional cash transfer program in Mexico.26
Despite reversing some of the changes to self-employment, the worsening of the
productivity distribution among the self-employed is not undone in general
26The general equilibrium effects of the model correspond to what we should observe by comparing
different local labor markets with differential exposure to cash transfers.
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Moment GE - τ GE PE Moment GE - τ GE PE
% ∆ W -0.58 -1.15 -— ∆ E -1.04 -0.77 -2.47
% ∆ Y -2.25 -2.24 -— ∆ S -1.15 -0.66 -3.80
%∆ TFP -1.15 -1.17 -— ∆ U -0.11 -0.11 -1.34
Table 5: Model Response to Targeted Cash Transfers
Note: The table presents changes in variables with respect to the baseline model. All numbers are in percentage
points. By design, the wage does not change in partial equilibrium. We refrain from reporting macroeconomic
aggregates that are constructed in partial equilibrium.
equilibrium. On top of this, the decrease in asset holdings among the self-employed
makes them more constrained, further reducing productivity (see equation 11). This is
reflected in a fall of aggregate TFP by 1.17 percent.
Targeted cash transfers in general equilibrium and balanced budget We introduce a
linear labor income tax to finance the expenditures of the targeted cash transfer. We set
a tax rate τtct of 3.2% in order to finance a transfer of bTCT units to a mass of TCT agents.
τtct
∫
w · ε(z)dGE = bTCT · TCT. (15)
Once we account for the effects of financing the expenditures, the distortions created
by the policy are still present. Despite the fall in wages being half of what it was without
taxes, the introduction of an income tax on employed individuals further incentivizes
self-employment over employment (after tax wages decrease 3.76 percent). The result is
an increase in self-employment of 1.15 percentage points, almost double that in the GE
case. The inflow of self-employed agents slightly changes TFP, but the productivity loss
remains, driven as before by a worsening of the selection of self-employment towards
less productive and less wealthy agents.
Thus, in the presence of subsistence self-employment, across-the-board income
transfers entail general equilibrium effects that reverse most of the positive effects in
partial equilibrium. Once we account for the behavior of wages to clear the labor
market, self-employment increases and total factor productivity falls.
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6.3 Self-Employment Grants
In this section, we implement a cash transfer to low-earning self-employed agents. To
keep the policies comparable, we maintain the threshold and transfer size that we used
for the targeted cash transfers (17 percent of labor income to agents below the 10th
percentile of the baseline earnings distribution). The size of the transfer is substantial
once we take into account the prevalence of low-earning self-employed agents in the
economy: this grant amounts to 60 percent of the average assets of the targeted group
in the baseline economy.27 Moreover, the transfer is handed out every quarter as long
as the agent meets the policy’s earnings requirements.
This policy generates drastic changes in the composition of the workforce, which
we summarize in Table 6. Unemployment vanishes regardless of whether prices or
taxes adjust.There is also a marked reduction in employment (over 5 percentage points
in partial equilibrium). This is partly because grants make self-employment more
alluring for unproductive employed agents, but it is also a consequence of agents
avoiding unemployment, as self-employed agents have a lower job-offer arrival rate
than unemployed agents. The decrease in employment is cut in half in general
equilibrium after an increase in the wage rate.
In line with the literature, we find that this policy leads to a decrease in TFP (Buera,
Kaboski, and Shin, 2020), regardless of whether the policy is paid for using labor income
taxes. The decrease is large, with aggregate TFP falling around 2.5 percentage points.
The reason behind the decrease in productivity is the deterioration of the productivity
distribution of those in self-employment. Figure 9a shows how the policy works as an
incentive for agents with low productivity to become self-employed, in effect worsening
the distribution of productivity (in the FOSD sense) with respect to the baseline. Self-
employed increases across the earnings distribution, except at the very top, as Figure 9b
shows.28
27The situation would be quite different without unemployment risk, when the self-employed are high-
earning and typically wealthy agents. In that case, a transfer of a comparable size would not lead to the
drastic changes in workforce compositions we find.
28In partial equilibrium, the increase in the self-employment rate is stronger and occurs throughout the
distribution. The increase in wages reduces the share of high-earning self-employed agents.
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Moment GE - τ GE PE Moment GE - τ GE PE
% ∆ W -1.4 -1.0 — ∆ E -2.7 -2.5 -5.2
% ∆ Y -2.6 -2.4 — ∆ S -6.8 -6.6 -9.3
% ∆ TFP -2.4 -2.5 — ∆ U -4.1 -4.1 -4.1
Table 6: Model Response to Self-Employment Grants
Note: The table presents changes in variables with respect to the baseline model. All numbers are in percentage
points. By design, the wage does not change in partial equilibrium. We refrain from reporting macroeconomic
aggregates that are constructed in partial equilibrium.
Figure 9: Model Response to Self-Employment Grants in General Equilibrium
(a) CDF of Productivity
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Note: The left panel reports the CDF of productivity among self-employed agents. The continuous red line
corresponds to the baseline model. The dashed yellow line corresponds to the model with grants in general
equilibrium. The right panel reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution.
The red circles correspond to the baseline model. The yellow squares correspond to the model with grants in general
equilibrium.
6.4 Financial Sector Reform
Finally, we use the model to study the effects of policies that loosen the collateral
constraints of self-employed agents. Micro-finance programs are common in
developing economies, generally motivated by dysfunctional credit markets that
prevent entrepreneurs’ access to credit. These financial constraints curtail the growth of
productive entrepreneurs. However, the experimental literature has found only small
average effects following the provision of micro-credit in developing countries. See,
among others, Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2015) and Banerjee, Breza,
Duflo, and Kinnan (2019).
The spirit of these policies is to alleviate financial frictions by improving agents’
access to credit. However, the general equilibrium effects of such reforms are not trivial
30
to determine, because agents will react by changing their occupational choices as credit
becomes more widely available. At the same time, credit-deepening reforms will
improve allocative efficiency, in turn increasing productivity and wages. We proceed in
two steps. First, we study the effects of a moderate reform that loosens the collateral
constraint of the self-employed. Second, we compare these results with those following
a complete elimination of credit frictions.
Credit Deepening We start by introducing a partial loosening of self-employed
agents’ collateral constraints. In particular, we increase the credit line that
self-employed individuals can get from λa to (λ + λcd)a. We understand this reform
broadly as an improvement of financial markets in developing economies. The new
collateral constraint takes the form of
k ≤ (λ+ λcd) · a, (16)
and we assume that λcd is such that the collateral constraint is 20% less stringent than
in the baseline model.
In partial equilibrium, the loosening of the collateral constraint induces individuals
to enter into self-employment, especially among individuals with higher earnings, a
group which includes individuals with high productivity (and consequently higher
optimal scale) and those with large asset holdings (who can rent more capital as a
result of the reform). See Figure 10b. However, as shown in Figures 10a and 11a, there
is entry to self-employment among low earners as well. With fixed prices, the reform
causes large occupational changes. Self-employment would increase by 3.72%.
In general equilibrium most of these occupational changes dissipate, a comparison
shown in Figures 11a and 11b. The reason is that the wage rate increases in order to
clear the labor market. The increase in the wage rate produces a decrease in the
self-employment rate of around 0.98%, and an increase of the unemployment rate of
0.54%. These results are reminiscent of the channels highlighted by Feng, Lagakos, and
Rauch (2020). As economies develop, unemployment is created as a byproduct.
Because capital can be assigned more efficiently to high-productivity entrepreneurs, the
reform increases TFP in 0.9% and is the main driver behind an increase in aggregate
output of 1.1%.
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Figure 10: Model Response to Credit Deepening in Partial Equilibrium
(a) CDF of Productivity
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Note: The left panel reports the CDF of productivity among self-employed agents. The continuous red line
corresponds to the baseline model. The dashed yellow line corresponds to the model with credit deepening in partial
equilibrium. The right panel reports productivity thresholds characterizing the occupational choice of unemployed
agents for the baseline model (continuous light gray line) and the model with credit deepening (dashed dark gray
line). Lines depict the threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of assets (a). The agent chooses self-
employment if productivity is above the threshold.
Moment GE PE Moment GE PE
% ∆ W 0.07 — ∆ E -0.02 -0.11
% ∆ Y 0.04 — ∆ S -0.17 -0.02
% ∆ TFP 0.12 — ∆ U -0.16 -0.09
Table 7: Model Response to Credit Deepening
Note: The table presents changes in variables with respect to the baseline model. All numbers are in percentage
points. By design, the wage does not change in partial equilibrium. We refrain from reporting macroeconomic
aggregates that are constructed in partial equilibrium.
Elimination of Collateral Constraints (λcd→∞) At fixed prices, the elimination of
collateral constraints creates two effects, illustrated in Figures 12a and 12b. Figure 12a
shows that the elimination of collateral constraints shifts the distribution of productivity
of the entrepreneurs to the right, as more productive firms are able to produce more.
Figure 12b shows that for sufficiently rich agents, the reform makes selection into self-
employment flat with respect to wealth. The model still predicts an increasing profile
of selection for sufficiently poor agents who still have subsistence concerns that are not
directly solved via the elimination of collateral constraints.
Figure 12c, which reproduces Figure 4b, shows the joint distribution of
self-employment and earnings. In an economy without collateral constraints, the
self-employment rate goes down by 7 percentage points and is accompanied by an
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Figure 11: Self-Employment Rate and Credit Deepening
(a) Partial Equilibrium
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(b) General Equilibrium
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Note: The figure reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution. The red circles
correspond to the baseline model. The yellow squares in the left panel correspond to the model with a credit-deepening
reform in partial equilibrium. The yellow squares in the right panel correspond to the model with unemployment
benefits in general equilibrium.
increase in unemployment of 4.5 percentage points. Aggregate output increases by
32%, with TFP rising 11%. In order to clear the labor market, the wage rate goes up by
19%, while aggregate salaried employment increases by 2.5%.
Financial sector reforms are beneficial to productivity and generate unemployment
as a byproduct, as more individuals move from low-productivity self-employment
activities into frictional labor markets. However, financial reform, even when taken to
the limit of eliminating collateral constraints, does not solve the subsistence concerns
that lead individuals to choose self-employment. Other policies, like unemployment
benefits, have a more direct effect on agents facing subsistence concerns.
The effects of financial reforms also illustrate the importance of general equilibrium
analysis. While the partial equilibrium effects of the reform point to a large increase in
self-employment, the general equilibrium analysis shows those conclusions would be
premature. As firms have better access to credit, productive firms grow and increase
the overall productivity of the economy. This invariably leads to higher wages, which
in turn affect agents’ occupational choices. The net effect of these reforms is likely to be
a better selection into self-employment, with fewer but more successful self-employed
agents.
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Figure 12: Model without Collateral Constraints
(a) CDF of Productivity
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(c) Self-Employment Rate
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Note: Panel (a) reports the CDF of productivity among self-employed agents. The continuous red line corresponds
to the baseline model. The dashed yellow line corresponds to the model with credit deepening in partial equilibrium.
Panel (b) reports productivity thresholds characterizing the occupational choice of unemployed agents for the baseline
model (continuous light gray line) and the model with credit deepening (dashed dark gray line). Lines depict the
threshold value of productivity (z) for each level of assets (a). The agent chooses self-employment if productivity is
above the threshold. Panel (c) reports the share of self-employed agents for each decile of the earnings distribution.
The red circles correspond to the baseline model. The yellow squares correspond to the model without collateral
constraints in general equilibrium.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Self-employment can reflect the entrepreneurial drive of a society, signaling innovation
and growth. But it can also reflect subsistence concerns of individuals looking for an
income source when no alternatives are available. This is painfully evident across
developing economies characterized by high self-employment rates, concentrated
among the poor. Clarifying the features of an economy that lead to large numbers of
low-earning, self-employed agents is crucial to understanding the effects of policies
that are often used to alleviate poverty or foster growth.
We show that the features of self-employment in developing economies are
consistent with its role as self-insurance for poor individuals. Consequently, policies
that supplement this insurance role, like providing unemployment income, are
effective at preventing low-productivity individuals from becoming self-employed.
This in turn has important general equilibrium implications, tied to increases in
productivity and employment. On the contrary, policies aiming to promote
entrepreneurship can have unintended consequences by making self-employment
more attractive for low-productivity individuals, resulting in lower aggregate
productivity. The precariousness of the material conditions of the poor mean that even
small incentives have a large impact on their occupational choices.
We argue that incorporating labor market frictions alongside financial frictions is
critical to correctly capture the aggregate dynamics of developing economies and their
response to policy. Doing so not only improves the fit of models to salient features
of developing economies, but it also brings macro-development models in line with
micro-estimates of the identified response of the economy to shocks (e.g., the response
of wages to labor demand shocks). The key mechanism lies in incorporating the view
that subsistence concerns dominate selection into self-employment among the poor.
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Appendices
A Equilibrium of the model
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a set of value functions
{
V o, Ṽ o
}
o∈{E,U,S}
,
along with optimal consumption functions {co}o∈{E,U,S}, labor and capital demand
from self-employed {n, k}, prices {r, w} , a distribution of agents for each occupation
{Go}o∈{E,U,S}, given exogenous shifters {z} such that:
1. Value functions are consistent with individual optimization. That is, they satisfy
equations (1)-(3) and equations (5)-(7).
2. Consumption (and thus asset accumulation) is consistent with the agent’s
optimization. That is, it is given by equation (4).
3. Capital and labor demand solve the profit-maximization problem of the
self-employed. That is, they are given by (A.5) and (A.6) if ν < 1, or by (A.7) if
ν = 1.
4. Labor market clears: NS = ND, where total labor supply is given by (8), and total
labor demand by (9).
5. The interest rate is given by the international interest rate r?.
6. The distribution of agents is stationary. For this, the densities gE , gU , and gS of
employed, unemployed, and self-employed agents must satisfy the system of
Kolmogorov-Forward Equations (KFE) defined by29
0 = − ∂
∂a
[
ȧgU (a, z)
]
+ χEU (a, z, ) gE (a, z, ) + χSU (a, z) gS (a, z) (A.1)
− χUS (a, z) gU (a, z)− γUPrU (ε) gU (a, z)1{V E(a,z)>V U (a,z)}
− γz
∫
Prz (z′|z) gU (a, z) dz′ + γz
∫
Prz
(
z|z′
)
gU (a, z′) dz′,
0 = − ∂
∂a
[
ȧgS (a, z)
]
+ χES (a, z, ε) gE (a, z) + χUS (a, z) gU (a, z) (A.2)
− χSU (a, z) gS (a, z)− γSgS (a, z)1{V E(a,z)>V S(a,z)}
− γz
∫
Prz (z′|z) gS (a, z) dz′ + γz
∫
Prz
(
z|z′
)
gS (a, z′) dz′
29The density functions are also such that: 1 =
∫ ∫ (∫
gE (a, z, ε) dε+ gU (a, z) + gS (a, z)
)
da dz. So∫
gE (a, z, ε) da dz dε gives the mass of employed agents, and
∫
go (a, z) da dz for o ∈ {U, S} gives the mass
of unemployed and self-employed agents.
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0 = − ∂
∂a
[
ȧgE (a, z)
]
− γE − χEU (a, z) gE (a, z)− χES (a, z) gE (a, z, ε) (A.3)
+ γUPrU (ε) gU (a, z)1{V E(a,z)>V U (a,z)}
+ γSgS (a, z)1{V E(a,z)>V S(a,z)}
− γz
∫
Prz (z′|z) gE (a, z) dz′ + γz
∫
Prz
(
z|z′
)
gE (a, z′) dz′
In the definition of the stationary distribution we let χoo′ be an indicator function for
the occupational choice of the agents. Then for the employed we have:
χEo
′
(a, z, ) =
{
1 if V E (a, z) = Ṽ o′ (a, z)
0 otherwise
,
where o′ ∈ {U, S}. For the unemployed and the self-employed we have:
χUS (a, z) =
{
1 if V U (a, z) = Ṽ S (a, z)
0 otherwise
and χSU (a, z) =
{
1 if V S (a, z) = Ṽ U (a, z)
0 otherwise
.
Of course χoo = 1 indicates no change in the agent’s occupation.
The profit maximization problem of the self-employed is given by:
π (a, z) = max
k≤λa , n≥0
{
z
(
kαn1−α
)ν − wn− (r + δ) k} . (A.4)
The solution to the problem when ν < 1 is characterized by the following demand
for labor:
n (a, z) =
(
ν (1− α) z
w
) 1
1−(1−α)ν
(k (a, z))
αν
1−(1−α)ν , (A.5)
and capital:
k (a, z) = min
{
ν
1
1−ν z
1
1−ν
(
α
r + δ
) 1−(1−α)ν
1−ν
(
1− α
w
) (1−α)ν
1−ν
, λa
}
. (A.6)
In the case of ν = 1 production is only profitable if z ≥ z =
(
r+δ
α
)α ( w
1−α
)1−α, then:
n (a, z) =
(
(1− α) z
w
) 1
α
k (a, z) , with k (a, z) = λa1{z≥z} . (A.7)
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B Model without unemployment risk
In this section we describe a simplified model without unemployment risk. We lay
out the model in general terms allowing for a labor efficiency component independent
(ε) of the agent’s productivity (z). In the calibration we set the variance of ε to zero
for comparability with our baseline model, results with both sources of variation are
available upon request. As before, an agent is free to become self-employed at any point,
but now the agent is also free to become employed in response to changes in her labor
efficiency, productivity or assets. There is no change in the profit maximization problem
of the self-employed, or in the definition of total supply and demand for labor.
B.1 Agent’s Problem
Because agents can change instantly across occupations, the occupational choice
problem reduces to maximizing instantaneous income. The value of an agent is then:
ρV (a, z, ε) = max
c
u (c) + Va (a, z, ε) ȧ+ γ
ε
∫
V (a, z, ε′) dPrε (ε′|ε) + γz
∫
V (a, z′, ε) dPrz (z′|z)
s.t. ȧ = max {wε(ε, z), π (a, z)}+ ra− c a ≥ a (B.1)
with π (a, z) given as in equation (A.4), and ε(ε, z) = ε+ ηz.
The optimal consumption decision is found as in Section 3, following equation (4).
Finally agents are employed if wε(ε, z) ≥ π (a, z) and as self-employed otherwise.
B.2 Equilibrium
An stationary equilibrium for this economy is a value function {V }, along with an
optimal consumption function {c}, labor and capital demand from self-employed
{n, k}, prices {r, w} and a distribution of agents {G} such that:
1. The value function satisfies (B.1).
2. Consumption (and thus asset accumulation) are consistent with the agent’s
optimization. That is, it is given by equation (4).
3. Capital and labor demand solve the self-employed’s profit maximization problem.
That is, they are given by (A.5) and (A.6) if ν < 1, or by (A.7) if ν = 1.
4. Labor market clears: NS = ND, satisfying equations (8) and (9).
5. The interest rate is given by the international interest rate r?.
6. The distribution of agents is stationary and solves:
0 = − ∂
∂a
[ȧg (a, z, ε)]− γz
∫
Prz (z′|z) g (a, z, ε) dz′ + γz
∫
Prz
(
z|z′
)
g (a, z′, ε) dz′
− γε
∫
Prε (ε′|ε) g (a, z, ε) dε′ + γε
∫
Prε
(
ε|ε′
)
g (a, z, ε′) dε′ (B.2)
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C Model: additional graphs and tables
Shocks Preferences
ε Labor Efficiency - Base Value ρ Discount Factor
σε Labor Efficiency - Variance σ CRRA Parameter
ρε Labor Efficiency - Persistence Technology
γε Labor Efficiency - Arrival Rate α Capital Share
z Productivity - Base Value δ Capital Depreciation
σz Productivity - Variance ν Decreasing Returns
ρz Productivity - Persistence Assets
γz Productivity - Arrival Rate λ Equity Constraint
γU Job Offer Arrival Rate - Unemployed a Borrowing Constraint
γS Job Offer Arrival Rate - Self-employed a Asset Barrier
γE Job Destruction Arrival Rate Income
η Productivity - Labor Efficiency b Unemployed Income
Table C.1: Model Parameters
Figure C.1: Productivity Changes after Labor Demand Shock
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(b) Difference of Mass per z−type
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Note: The figures show changes in the distribution of productivity (z) between the equilibrium of the baseline model
and the model with government labor demand. The left panel presents the difference in the CDF of productivity
among the self-employed relative to the baseline model. Negative values indicate that the new distribution first order
stochastically dominates the baseline distribution. The right panel presents the difference in the mass of self-employed
agents for each z−type. Differences are due to changes in the distribution and overall mass of self-employed agents.
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D Computational appendix
D.1 Solution to HJB equations
The model is solved using an implicit finite difference method as the one shown in
Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2020). The occupational choice is solved through
a splitting method, solving first for an auxiliary value Ṽ , the value that applies if the
agent continues in the same occupation, and then solving for the occupational choice.
We present a more general model that allows for separate labor efficiency and
productivity processes.
Consider grids over assets, entrepreneurial ability and labor efficiency:
~a = [a1, . . . , ana ] ~z = [z1, . . . , znz ] ~ε = [ε1, . . . , εnε ]
with na, nz and nε elements respectively, and constant distance between grid points of
∆a, ∆z and ∆ε. Let i denote the index of the asset dimension, j of the entrepreneurial
ability, and k of the labor efficiency.
For notational convenience we will treat all value functions as depending on all
three states, it is understood that V U and V S do not vary across ε. Denote
V oijk = V
o (ai, zj, εk) and let the backward and forward difference of the value function
approximate the derivative:
V oa (ai, zj, εk) ≈
V oi+1,jk − V oijk
∆a
= ∂aV
o
ijk,F V
o
a (ai, zj, εk) ≈
V oijk − V oi−1,jk
∆a
= ∂aV
o
ijk,B .
The problem to solve is:
ρṼ Eijk = u
(
cEijk
)
+ ∂aV
E
ijk ·
(
yEijk + rai − cEijk
)
+ γE
(
V Uij − Ṽ Eijk
)
(D.1)
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
(
V Eij′k − Ṽ Eijk
)
Prz (zj′ |zj) + γε
nε∑
k′=1
(
V Eijk′ − Ṽ Eijk
)
Prε (εk′|εk)
ρṼ Uij = u
(
cUij
)
+ ∂aV
U
ij ·
(
yUij + rai − cUij
)
+ γU
nε∑
k′=1
(
V Eijk′ − Ṽ Uij
)
PrU (εk′)1{V E
ijk′>V
U
ij
} (D.2)
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
(
V Uij′ − Ṽ Uij
)
Prz (zj′|zj)
ρṼ Sij = u
(
cSij
)
+ ∂aV
S
ij ·
(
ySij + rai − cSij
)
(D.3)
+ γS
nε∑
k′=1
(
V Eijk′ − Ṽ Sij
)
PrS (εk′)1{V E
ijk′>V
S
ij
} + γz
nz∑
j′=1
(
V Sij′ − Ṽ Sij
)
Prz (zj′ |zj)
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together with:
V Eijk = max
{
Ṽ Eij,k, Ṽ
U
ij , Ṽ
S
ij
}
(D.4)
V Uij = max
{
Ṽ Uij , Ṽ
S
ij
}
(D.5)
V Sij = max
{
Ṽ Uij , Ṽ
S
ij
}
(D.6)
The implicit method solves the following equation on Ṽ o,n+1ijk given a value for V
o,n
ijk .
For employment the equation is:
Ṽ E,n+1ijk − Ṽ
E,n
ijk
∆
+ ρṼ E,n+1ijk = u
(
cE,nijk
)
+ ∂aṼ
E,n+1
ijk · s
E,n
ijk + γ
E
(
Ṽ U,n+1ij − Ṽ
E,n+1
ijk
)
(D.7)
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
(
Ṽ E,n+1ij′k − Ṽ
E,n+1
ijk
)
Prz (zj′ |zj)
+ γε
nε∑
k′=1
(
Ṽ E,n+1ijk′ − Ṽ
E,n+1
ijk
)
Prε (εk′|εk)
For o ∈ {U, S} the equation is:
Ṽ o,n+1ij − Ṽ
o,n
ij
∆
+ ρṼ o,n+1ij = u
(
co,nij
)
+ ∂aṼ
o,n+1
ij · s
o,n
ij +
nε∑
k′=1
γ̃o,nijk′
(
Ṽ E,n+1ijk′ − Ṽ
o,n+1
ij
)
Pro (εk′)
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
(
Ṽ o,n+1ij′ − Ṽ
o,n+1
ij
)
Prz (zj′ |zj) (D.8)
Note that the (known) value at iteration n is used to compute consumption, and the drift
of the assets, which we will call savings for convenience:
so,nijk = y
o
ijk + rai − c
o,n
ijk where c
o,n
ijk = u
′−1 (∂aV o,nijk )
It is also used to define if the agent is willing to change after a job offer. We have:
γ̃U,nijk = γ
U
1{
V E,n
ijk′ >V
U,n
ij
} γ̃S,nijk = γS1{V E,n
ijk′ >V
S,n
ij
}
Next it is necessary to determine whether to use the forward or backward
approximation to the first derivatives of the value function. We follow the “upwind
scheme” presented in Achdou et al. (2020).
Since consumption can be defined with the backward or forward difference
approximation we get:
so,nijk,B = y
o
ijk + rai − u
′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,B) so,nijk,F = yoijk + rai − u′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,F )
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The idea is to use the backward difference when the implied drift is negative, and the
forward difference when the drift is positive. Yet there are cases for which so,nijk,F <
0 < so,nijk,B, in these cases we set savings equal to zero, so the derivative is not used,
in any case the FOC of the problem gives the exact derivate of the value function as:
∂aV
o,n
ijk = u
′
(yjk + rai).30
Consumption is then:
co,nijk = u
′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,B)1{so,nijk,B<0}+u′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,F )1{so,nijk,F>0}+ (yoijk + rai)1{so,nijk,F<0<so,nijk,B} ,
and the drift term for assets is replaced by:
∂aṼ
o,n+1
ijk · s
o,n
ijk = ∂aṼ
o,n+1
ijk,B
[
so,nijk,B
]−
+ ∂aṼ
o,n+1
ijk,F
[
so,nijk,F
]+
=
Ṽ o,n+1ijk − Ṽ
o,n+1
i−1,jk
∆a
[
so,nijk,B
]−
+
Ṽ o,n+1i+1,jk − Ṽ
o,n+1
ijk
∆a
[
so,nijk,F
]+
Grouping terms we get the following expression for employment:
Ṽ E,n+1ijk − Ṽ
E,n
ijk
∆
+ ρṼ E,n+1ijk = u
(
cE,nijk
)
+ γEṼ U,n+1ij
+ xEijkṼ
E,n+1
ijk + x
E−
ijk Ṽ
E,n+1
i−1,jk + x
E+
ijk Ṽ
E,n+1
i+1,jk
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
Prz (zj′ |zj) Ṽ E,n+1ij′k + γ
ε
nε∑
k′=1
Prε (εk′|εk) Ṽ E,n+1ijk′
where
xEijk =
[
sE,nijk,B
]−
∆a
−
[
sE,nijk,F
]+
∆a
− γE − γz − γε
xE−ijk = −
[
sE,nijk,B
]−
∆a
xE+ijk =
[
sE,nijk,F
]+
∆a
30Additional care is needed because of the non-convexities introduced by the occupational choice of
agents. It is possible that both so,nijk,B < 0 and that s
o,n
ijk,F > 0 for the same state. In this case we take the
drift that provides the highest change in value by comparing u
(
co,nijk,B
)
+∂aV
o,n
ijk,B ·s
o,n
ijk,B with u
(
co,nijk,F
)
+
∂aV
o,n
ijk,F · s
o,n
ijk,F . We omit this from the notation for readability.
46
For unemployment and self-employment:
Ṽ o,n+1ij − Ṽ
o,n
ij
∆
+ ρṼ o,n+1ij = u
(
co,nij
)
+
nε∑
k′=1
γ̃o,nijk′Pr
o (εk′) Ṽ
E,n+1
ijk′
+ xoijṼ
o,n+1
ij + x
o−
ij Ṽ
o,n+1
i−1,j + x
o+
ij Ṽ
o,n+1
i+1,j
+ γz
nz∑
j′=1
Prz (zj′|zj) Ṽ o,n+1ij′
where
xoij =
[
so,nij,B
]−
∆a
−
[
so,nij,F
]+
∆a
−
nε∑
k′=1
γ̃o,nijk′Pr
o (εk′)− γz
xo−ij = −
[
so,nij,B
]−
∆a
xo+ij =
[
so,nij,F
]+
∆a
D.1.1 Boundary Conditions
A final loose end before writing up the linear system in matrix form is what to do with
the boundaries of the different grids. At the lower boundary of the asset grid the agent
is subject to a no-borrowing constraint. Hence it has to be the case that the agent does
not try to borrow. The drift has to be non-negative at that point, which implies that
x̃o−1jk = 0 for all (j, k). At the upper boundary a similar constraint can be imposed, so that
x̃o+najk = 0. This should arise naturally if the upper boundary is high enough. Notice that
imposing these restrictions implies that V n+10j and V
n+1
na+1,j
are not part of the system.
D.1.2 System Solution
The equations above describe a system of na × nz (2 + nε) equations, its best to define
the value function a stack of three value functions, one for each occupation:
V =
[
V U ;V S;V E
]T
V o = vec
[
V oijk
]
The system is:
1
∆
(
V n+1 − V n
)
+ ρV n+1 = un + AnV n+1
where un =
[
uU,n;uS,n;uE,n
]
and uo,n = vec
[
u
(
co,nijk
)]
with consumption computed as
explained above.
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Matrix An is given by:
An = Bn + C +D
Bn =
 BnUU 0 BnUE0 BnSS BnSE
BEU 0 B
n
EE
 C =
 C̃ 0 00 C̃ 0
0 0 C̃E
 D =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 D̃

The matrices Bnoo are sparse and they only contain elements in the diagonal, upper
diagonal and lower diagonal. Consider Xo =
[
x̃oijk
]
, X−o =
[
x̃o,−ijk
]
and X+o =
[
x̃o,+ijk
]
, all
three dimensional matrix that contain the coefficients x̃ (note that x̃ is already adjusted
for the boundaries). Then we have: diag (Bnoo) = vec (Xo), diag
+ (Bnoo) = vec (X+o ) and
diag− (Bnoo) = vec (X−o ), where the upper diagonal and lower diagonal are adjusted not
to include the zero terms of the boundaries.
The matrices Bn
oo′
depend on the type of transition. For the transition from
employment to unemployment we have:
BEU = γ
E
 Ina·nz...
Ina·nz

so that BEU is of size na · nz · nε × na · nz. For the transition from unemployment and
self-employment to employment:
BnoE = γ
o
[
Pro (ε1) diag
(
vec
(
1{V Eij1>V oij}
))
· · · Pro (εnε) diag
(
vec
(
1{V Eijnε>V oij}
)) ]
where we abuse notation by letting diag (·) give a diagonal matrix when it is evaluated
in a vector.
Matrices C̃ and D̃ are also sparse and they are independent of the iteration. Their
construction takes advantage of the fact that the elements of C̃ only vary with j and the
elements of D̃ only vary with k. We first construct C̃ = γzPrz ⊗ Ina and C̃E = γzInε ⊗ C̃.
Finally, D̃ = γεPrε ⊗ Ina·nz .
This problem can now be expressed as:
T nV n+1 = tn
where:
T n =
(
1
∆
+ ρ
)
Inanz(2+nε) − An tn = un +
1
∆
V n
D.1.3 Algorithm
1. Compute matrices C andD. These matrices do not change with equilibrium prices
or iterations.
2. Take as given w.
3. Solve for earnings in each state: yoijk for each combination of (a, z, ε) and
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occupation. These values don’t change with iterations.
4. Guess a value for V n, a nanz (2 + nε) vector. It is easier to store it as three separate
matrices of dimensions na × nz, na × nz and na × nε × nz.
(a) We find it better to find the initial condition by solving for a fixed point of the
problem without occupational choice (this same algorithm without the last
step).
5. Compute the backward and forward drift: so,nijk,B and s
o,n
ijk,F for i = {2, . . . , na} and
i = {1, . . . , na − 1} respectively, and all (j, k, o).
so,nijk,B = y
o
jk + rai − u
′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,B) so,nijk,F = yojk + rai − u′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,F )
These values are stored in six matrices (two per occupation, one with backward
drift and the other one with forward drift).
6. For all (i, j, k, o) compute consumption as:
co,nijk = u
′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,B) 1so,nijk,B<0 + u′−1 (∂aV o,nijk,F ) 1so,nijk,F>0 + (yojk + rai) 1so,nijk,F<0<so,nijk,B
These values are stored in three matrices of dimensions na × nz, na × nz and na ×
nε × nz.
7. Compute the utility vector as: un =
[
uU,n;uS,n;uE,n
]
and uo,n = vec
[
u
(
co,nijk
)]
.
8. Compute the adjusted shock arrival rates:
γ̃U,nijk = γ
U1V E,nijk >V
U,n
ijk
γ̃S,nijk = γ
S1V E,nijk >V
U,n
ijk
γ̃E,nijk = γ
E
9. Compute the matrices Xo =
[
x̃oijk
]
, X−o =
[
x̃o,−ijk
]
and X+o =
[
x̃o,+ijk
]
.
10. Compute matrix Bn =
 BnUU 0 BnUE0 BnSS BnSE
BnEU 0 B
n
EE
, where diag (Bnoo) = vec (Xo),
diag+ (Bnoo) = vec (X+o ) and diag
− (Bnoo) = vec (X−o ), where the upper diagonal
and lower diagonal are adjusted not to include the zero terms of the boundaries.
The matrices Bn
oo′
are defined above.
11. Compute the matrix An = Bn + C +D.
12. Compute the matrix T and vector t:
T n =
(
1
∆
+ ρ
)
I3nanεnz − An tn = un +
1
∆
V n
13. Compute V n+1/2 as:
V n+
1/2 = (T n)−1 tn
(a) We use the Biconjugate gradients stabilized (l) method, preconditioned with
LU Factorization. See Matlab functions “ilu” and “bicgstabl.”
14. Divide the vector V n+1/2 into three matrices of na × nz, na × nz and na × nε × nz:
V U,n+1/2, V S,n+1/2, and V E,n+1/2.
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15. Compute V U,n+1, V S,n+1, and V E,n+1 as follows:
V U,n+1ijk = max
{
V
U,n+1/2
ijk , Ṽ
S
ijk
}
V S,n+1ijk = max
{
V
U,n+1/2
ijk , V
S,n+1/2
ijk
}
V E,n+1ijk = max
{
V
U,n+1/2
ijk , Ṽ
S
ijk , V
E,n+1/2
ijk
}
(a) Define the following matrices as indicators of the occupation choice:
[
χ̃oo
′
ijk
]
χ̃USij =
{
1 if V U,n+1ij = Ṽ
S
ij
0 otw
χ̃SUij =
{
1 if V S,n+1ij = V
U,n+1/2
ij
0 otw
χ̃EUijk =
{
1 if V E,n+1ijk = V
U,n+1/2
ij
0 otw
χ̃ESijk =
{
1 if V E,n+1ijk = Ṽ
S
ij
0 otw
These functions are 1 if the agent changes occupations at (i, j, k).
(b) Define now the vectors χoo
′
= vec
(
χ̃oo
′)
to be used later. χ is a vector of
length nanz (2 + nε).
D.2 Solution to KFE equations
Before solving the KFE the transition matrix A has to be modified to include the
endogenous transitions between unemployment and self-employment. For this we use
the indicators χ constructed as part of the value function iteration.
Now, consider a transition matrix P :
P =
 PUU PUS AUEP SU P SS ASE
PEU PES AEE

note that since there are not endogenous transitions to employment the last column
of matrices are just as in matrix A. The other columns are modified only if there are
endogenous transitions. Note that each matrix P oo
′
is of size nanεnz × nanεnz.
1. Make all matrices P oo
′
= Aoo
′
and P oo = Aoo.
2. For matrix P make zero any (column) entry related to an endogenous transition,
since these states are not reached. For all m and q in {1, . . . , nanεnz}:
P ∗Umq = 0 if χ
US (q) = 1
P ∗Smq = 0 if χ
SU (q) = 1
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P ∗Emq = 0 if χ
EU (q) = 1 or χES (q) = 1
where ∗ ∈ {U, S,E}.
3. For matrix P adjust entries to take into account endogenous transitions coming
from other occupation o into occupation o′ . This implies moving the columns of
P o∗ that were set to 0 because of transitions into P ∗o
′
. For all m and q in
{1, . . . , nanεnz}:
P ∗Sm,q−lq = P
∗S
m,q−lq + A
∗U
mq if χ
US (q) = 1
P ∗Umq = P
∗U
mq + A
∗S
mq if χ
SU (q) = 1
P ∗Umq = P
∗U
mq + A
∗E
mq if χ
EU (q) = 1
P ∗Sm,q−lq = P
∗S
m,q−lq + A
∗E
mq if χ
ES (q) = 1
where lq maps the index of the agent after paying the lk units of adjustment cost.
4. Finally as explained in Moll’s example for stopping time (multiple assets with
adjustment costs) the diagonal elements with transitions have to be adjusted:
PUUmm =
−1
∆
if χUS (m) = 1
P SSmm =
−1
∆
if χSU (m) = 1
PEEmm =
−1
∆
if χEU (m) = 1 or χES (m) = 1
Moll says: “To see why the −1/∆ term shows up, consider the time-discretized
process for g:
ġt = P
Tgt −→ gt+∆t = (∆P + I)T gt
where I is the identity matrix. The transition matrix P̃ = ∆P + I needs to have
all entries in the adjustment region C̃mm = 0 and hence ∆P + I = 0. Without the
adjustment, the matrix P is singular.
The system to solve is:
P Tg = 0
A simple way to solve the system is to make one of the elements of g to be equal to
an arbitrary number, and replace such row of P T by a row of zeros with a one in the
diagonal. Call this matrix P̃ T and let ι̃ = [0, . . . , 0, 0.1, 0, . . . , 0]T then solve for:
g̃ =
[
P̃ T
]−1
ι̃
Normalize g̃ so that it sums to 1: g̃ = g̃/sum(g̃). Finally define g as:
gi =
g̃i
∆ai
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E Additional Reduced Form Analysis
E.1 Workforce composition
Table E.1 shows the composition of the labor force in our sample and contrasts it with the
composition of the whole Mexican economy and the U.S. over the period 2005-2019. Our
sample behaves in a similar way to the overall Mexican labor force, while the differences
between Mexico and the U.S. are apparent, particularly in the share of self-employed
individuals.
Labor Status Our Sample General Population U.S.
Worker 69.1% 57.9% 80.7%
Unemployed 4.4% 3.9% 6.3%
Self Employed 26.7% 38.1% 12.9%
Table E.1: Workforce Composition
Note: The data for the Mexican general population are taken from the world development indicators (WDI). The
data for the U.S. are taken from the current population survey (CPS).
E.2 Mobility across occupations
In what follows we dig deeper into how the labor market status of an individual affects
transitions. To do so, we follow the same strategy as Katz and Krueger (2017) in their
study of alternative work arrangements in the U.S.. The first question we ask is whether
individuals who are unemployed are more likely to transition into self-employed. To
answer this we focus on the universe of individuals who are either employed or self-
employed in period t, and check whether the transitions to self-employment are larger
for those agents who were unemployed in the previous period.
This exercise differs from the conditional transition rates reported in Table 3. The
regression in this section allows us to control for the observable characteristics of
individuals, comparing transition rates across similar individuals in terms of age,
education and location, instead of computing transitions among individuals with the
same labor market status (e.g. unemployed). We take this evidence as only suggestive
of the mechanisms we study.
Table E.2 reports the regression results. The transition rates of unemployed agents
to self-employment are 20.9 percentage points higher than those exhibited by
observationally comparable agents who had a salaried job. This result holds after
controlling for age, education, and after adding time and city fixed-effects. While we
are not able to control for all the relevant factors affecting transitions into
self-employment, we interpret the higher transition rate from unemployment as
suggestive of the role of self-employment as an outside option for individuals who
need an income source, as opposed to self-employment representing entrepreneurial
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SE SE SE SE
Ut−1 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.208***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
St−1 0.717*** 0.717*** 0.706*** 0.706***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Age 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000]
Constant 0.080*** 0.109*** -0.027 -0.038
[0.005] [0.005] [395.990] [167.520]
Observations 1033397 1033397 1033397 1033397
Mean Ent 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.285
Schooling Controls No No Yes Yes
City Fixed Effect No No No Yes
Time Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E.2: Transitions to Self-Employment
Note: The LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual is self-employed and
zero if the individual is employed. Ut−1 and St−1 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the individual
was unemployed or self employed in the previous quarter respectively. Age is the age in years. Standard errors are
clustered at the city level. Schooling controls are a set of dummies by education level to control non-parametrically
for education. Time fixed effects are at the year-quarter level. The sample consists of individuals who are either
employed or self-employed in period t. We run the regressions by weighted OLS. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
activities for which the individual is better suited (relative to working in a salaried job).
Our results align with those of Katz and Krueger (2017) for the U.S.. They find that
unemployed individuals are more likely to transition to an alternative work
arrangement job than agents who are employed.
The second question we ask is whether individuals who become self-employed
transition less to salaried jobs. The effect of self-employment on the transitions into
employment matters to determine how persistent the effects of individual occupational
choices are, and how policies that affect those choices affect in turn the labor market. To
answer this question we focus on the universe of agents who are either unemployed or
self-employed in period t − 1, and follow them to determine whether or not they
become employed. As before this allows us to compare the transition rates of
self-employed individuals with comparable unemployed individuals.
Table E.3 presents the regression results. We do in fact find that self-employed
individuals are 34 percentage points less likely to transition to employment than
comparable unemployed individuals. Even if the actual effect of self-employment is not
as large, this estimate indicates that opting into self-employment can have long-lasting
implications for an individual, particularly for low-productivity self-employed who are
now less likely to abandon this state and move to employment. Jackson (2020) finds
similar results studying self-employed workers in the United States.
An important caveat for the results in Table E.3 is that we are not controlling for
53
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E E E E E
St−1 -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.340***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.014]
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Second Earner 0.022
[0.018]
St−1× Second Earner 0.024**
[0.011]
Constant 0.463*** 0.417*** 0.704*** 0.684*** 0.589
[0.015] [0.014] [0.103] [0.111] [1203.540]
Observations 327250 327250 327250 327250 145945
Mean Emp 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221
Schooling Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E.3: Transitions to Employment
Note: The LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual is employed in period
t. St−1 and Second Earner are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the individual was self-employed and if
the individual’s couple was an income earner in the previous quarter respectively. Age is the age in years. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level. Schooling controls are a set of dummies by education level to control non-
parametrically for education. Time fixed effects are at the year-quarter level. The sample consists of individuals who
were either unemployed or self-employed in period t − 1. We run the regressions by weighted OLS. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗,
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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selection into self-employment on the basis of entrepreneurial ability or preference for
self-employment. We also lack the full occupational history of individuals, so we
cannot condition on the attachment to self-employment of each individual. However,
we can partially address some of these shortcomings by focusing on individuals who
were unemployed to begin with (in period t − 2), and who then either remain
unemployed or transition to self-employment (in period t − 1). This lets us compare
individuals that start in a common state, and who then differ on whether or not they
transition through self-employment. When we perform this analysis the same result
emerges, with individuals who become self-employed being 14.4 percentage points less
likely to transition to employment in period t. The regression results can be found in
Table E.4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E E E E E
St−1 -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.144***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.050]
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Second Earner 0.035
[0.057]
St−1× Second Earner -0.024
[0.058]
Constant 0.383*** 0.456*** 0.854*** 0.863*** 1.327***
[0.017] [0.064] [0.226] [0.228] [0.075]
Observations 7320 7320 7320 7320 3205
Mean Emp 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355
Schooling Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table E.4: Transitions to Employment from Unemployment
Note: The LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual is employed in period
t. St−1 and Second Earner are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the individual was self-employed and if
the individual’s couple was an income earner in the previous quarter respectively. Age is the age in years. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level. Schooling controls are a set of dummies by education level to control non-
parametrically for education. Time fixed effects are at the year-quarter level. The sample consists of individuals who
were unemployed in period t− 2, and were not employed in period t− 1. We run the regressions by weighted OLS.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
E.3 Constrained agents transition more into self-employment
We now ask whether the transitions to self-employment we observe are consistent with
the idea that individuals who are more resource-constrained are more likely to become
self-employed. We focus on this mechanism for two main reasons. First, individuals
who choose self-employment out of necessity do so based less on their own preferences
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for self-employment or entrepreneurial ability,31 and more on the insurance properties
of self-employment, producing a larger share of unproductive small enterprises and
reducing aggregate productivity (section 2). Second, the decision to become
self-employed out of necessity can be influenced by policy more directly than when the
decision is dictated by the preferences or ability of the individual.
We use two variables to proxy for access to additional sources of income: the
presence of a second earner in the household (as in Chetty (2008)), and the receipt of
remittances from relatives living abroad. We compare transitions from unemployment
for constrained and unconstrained individuals. Table E.5 show the results. Individuals
with additional sources of income transit less into self-employment.32
Turning to the results in Table E.5a, we estimate that individuals in a household
with a second earner have a 3.2 percentage point higher probability of transitioning
to employment and a 3.9 percentage point lower probability of transitioning to self-
employment (a 17 percent decrease, from 22.2 to 18.3 percent) than individuals without
a second earner. We also test whether the individual’s (self-reported) job search activity
changes with the presence of a second earner (Table E.6). Most job-search activities (e.g.,
examining job postings, looking for a temporary job) are not significantly different for
individuals with a second earner. Importantly, there is no difference in whether agents
report being making plans to start their own business.
The same results are backed by the exercise using remittances as a proxy for the
resources of the individual. Individuals who receive remittances in times of
unemployment transition at a lower rate to self-employment (10.8 percent vs 18.8
percent, Table E.5b). We also check whether individuals receiving remittances differ on
search activities or the intent to start a business. Receiving remittances is associated
with a lower likelihood of using the internet to look for a job, and a lower likelihood of
of searching for temporary employment; however, it is also associated with a higher
likelihood of asking directly for a job (Table E.7). Of course, we cannot rule out other
sources of bias as the receipt of remittances is not created by exogenous variation across
individuals.
Finally, we repeat the exercise on the transition rates out of self-employment. We find
that less-constrained individuals are more likely to transition out of self-employment.
Self-employed agents are on average 2.4 percentage points more likely to transition to
employment when they are able to rely on a second earner. Unlike less-constrained self-
employed, those constrained cannot devote time/effort to search activities that facilitate
the transition to a salaried job. We report these results in column 5 of Tables E.3 and E.4.
31Hurst and Pugsley (2016) proposed non-pecuniary benefits from self-employment to explain the
patterns of self-employment in the U.S. This taste for self-employment complements standard arguments
for selection into self-employment based on own-perceptions (correct or not) of entrepreneurial ability, or
other idiosyncratic traits like a low job-finding rate.
32The results can also be interpreted as indicating that preferences and ability are not the main
drivers of the transition to self-employment. If they were, we should observe that people with external
income sources transit more to self-employment, as they could enjoy the non-pecuniary benefits of work
independence or try their luck at entrepreneurship, while not worrying (as much) about low income
levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
U→E U→S U→U U→I
Second Earner 0.032*** -0.039** 0.007 -0.000
[0.010] [0.018] [0.015] [0.000]
Age -0.008*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant 0.835*** 0.209 -0.044 -0.001
[0.301] [0.326] [0.098] [0.002]
Observations 8376 8376 8376 8376
Mean Dep. Variable 0.505 0.222 0.272 0.000104
Schooling Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes
(a) Second Earner and Transitions from Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
U→E U→S U→U U→I U→S
Remittances 0.058 -0.080*** -0.033 0.055
[0.053] [0.021] [0.040] [0.037]
Age -0.012*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Latent Remittances -0.045
[0.036]
Constant 1.237*** 0.147 -0.168*** -0.216 0.177
[0.262] [0.202] [0.050] [0.227] [0.114]
Observations 8615 8615 8615 8615 25135
Mean Dep. Variable 0.463 0.188 0.256 0.0932 0.188
Schooling Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Remittances and Transitions from Unemployment
Table E.5: Transitions from Unemployment
Note: In both panels, the LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual
experienced the transition specified in each column. U denotes unemployment, E salaried work, S self-employment,
and I inactivity. Second Earner is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual’s partner was
an income earner in period t − 1. Remittances is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual
reported having received remittances in period t − 1. Latent Remittances is a dummy equal to one if we observe
the individual to ever receive remittances. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Schooling controls are a
set of dummies by education level to control for education in a non parametric manner. Time fixed effects are at the
year-quarter level. The sample consists of individuals who were unemployed in period t−1. The regressions are run
by weighted OLS. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asked Job Post Public Ag Temp SE Plans Internet Newspaper Need to Work Age
Second Earner -0.033 -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.058*** -0.022 0.000 1.564***
[0.023] [0.010] [0.008] [0.003] [0.001] [0.019] [0.017] [0.000] [0.528]
Constant 0.203*** 0.021** 0.020** 0.008*** 0.001 0.105*** 0.069*** 0.000 41.063***
[0.022] [0.009] [0.008] [0.002] [0.001] [0.018] [0.016] [.] [0.497]
Observations 11214 11214 11214 11214 11214 11214 11214 11214 11214
Table E.6: Second Earner and Job-Search Activities
Note: The LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if individual i performed the given activity to search for a job in the previous quarter.
The last two columns correspond to weather or not the individual declares to have a need to work, and differences in age. Second Earner is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if the individual’s couple was an income earner in period t − 1. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions include
schooling controls (a set of dummies by education level to control non-parametrically for education), and time fixed effects at the year-quarter level. The sample
consists of individuals who were unemployed in period t − 1. The regressions are run by weighted OLS. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
58
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asked Job Posting Public Ag. Temp SE Plans Internet Newspaper Need to Work Age
Remittances 0.183* 0.023 0.004 -0.007*** -0.004** -0.035*** 0.092 0.045 -0.250
[0.103] [0.023] [0.012] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.089] [0.051] [2.385]
Constant 0.157*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 43.766***
[0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.212]
Observations 8200 8200 8200 8200 8200 8200 8200 8200 8200
Table E.7: Remittances and Job Search Activities
Note: The LHS variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if individual i performed the given activity to search for a job in the previous quarter.
The last two columns correspond to weather or not the individual declares to have a need to work, and differences in age. Remittances is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one if the individual reported having received remittances in period t− 1. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions include
schooling controls (a set of dummies by education level to control non-parametrically for education), and time fixed effects at the year-quarter level. The sample
consists of individuals who were unemployed in period t − 1. The regressions are run by weighted OLS. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
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Figure E.1: SE by Consumption Distribution
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Note: The figure reports the share of the population classified as self-employed for bins of the consumption
distribution for Colombia. Each bin corresponds to ten percent of the population. The horizontal dashed lines
correspond to the average self-employment rate.
E.4 Self-employment around the world
In this appendix we reproduce the exercise behind Figure 1b with data from 10
countries around the world We first run a regression of the form
log(earni,t) = α + γt + βXi,t + ηi,t, where earni,t corresponds to the earnings of
individual i at time t, and X is a vector of individual-level controls. We rank η̂i,t and
classify them in bins of 2 percent of the sample, then compute the self-employment rate
in each bins. In all cases we use harmonized household surveys.
Figure E.2 presents the results. The u-shape relationship between self-employment
and earnings with a skewed presence in the bottom of the earnings distribution is
common across countries, with the exception of Azerbaijan.
Finally, there is the concern that misreporting of income correlated with occupation
is behind this pattern. To address this, we show in Figure E.1 that the same pattern
of concentration at the bottom is present when comparing self-employment across the
consumption distribution. Self-employment is concentrated among those who consume
less.
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Figure E.2: Self-Employment and Earnings Across Countries
Note: The figure reports the share of the population classified as self-employed for bins of the earnings distribution
for ten countries around the world. Each bin corresponds to two percent of the population. The horizontal dashed
lines correspond to the average self-employment rate in each country.
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